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Abstract
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Reactor Technology Complex (RTC) buried piping and 
components are being characterized to determine if they should be managed as hazardous waste 
and subject to the Hazardous Waste Management Act /Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA). RTC buried piping and components involve both active piping and components from 
currently operating nuclear facilities, such as the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), and inactive 
lines from RTC facilities undergoing Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) activities, 
including the Materials Test Reactor (ETR) and the Engineering Test Reactor (ETR). The issue 
exists as to the proper methods to analyze and control hazards associated with D&D activities on 
facilities collocated with existing operating nuclear facilities, or future collocated facilities being 
considered with the resurgent nuclear industry. 
A qualitative hazard assessment was developed to evaluate the potential hazards associated with 
characterization activities, and any potential effects on the safety basis of the collocated RTC 
operating nuclear facilities. The hazard assessment clearly demonstrated the low hazards 
associated with the activities based on form and dispersiblity of the radioactive material in the 
piping and components. The hazard assessment developed unique controls to isolate active RTC 
piping and components from inactive components, and demonstrated that existing safety 
management programs were adequate for protection of the worker. 
1. INTRODUCTION
INL RTC inactive piping and components are undergoing RCRA Voluntary Consent Order 
(VCO) remediation activities. RTC systems undergoing VCO action include the RTC hot waste 
management system, designated as the VCO TRA-004 system. Characterization of the system 
began with the assumption that the radioactive material inventory was less than the hazard 
category (HC) 3 (LTHC 3) thresholds identified in DOE-STD-1207-92 (Reference 1). During 
initial characterization activities, it was determined that the residual material in one inactive line 
(2” HDA-661) could potentially exceed the HC 3 thresholds; therefore, a potential inadequacy in 
2the safety analysis (PISA) was declared. An unreviewed safety question (USQ) (Reference 2) 
resulted as reported in occurrence report NE-ID-BEA-RTC-2006-008 (Reference 3). A HC 3 or 
greater Nuclear Facility/Activity for the RTC VCO activities was also declared in the occurrence 
report.
An existing nuclear facility/activity safety basis does not exist for the VCO TRA-004 system. 
However, further characterization activities are required to confirm amount of material in the 
VCO TRA-004 system piping and components and determine the proper hazard category and 
level of safety basis documentation for further VCO activities. If further characterization 
determines that VCO TRA-004 system components are greater than or equal to HC 3, 
appropriate safety basis documentation will be required before further remediation activities 
begin. Characterization activities have been discontinued for HC 3 and non-categorized 
components until interim controls have been approved by Department of Energy Idaho 
Operations Office (DOE-ID) and implemented. VCO TRA-004 system piping and components 
with existing sample data that have been determined without question to be less than HC 3 and 
that are isolated are excluded from the RTC Inactive Piping Undergoing VCO Action Nuclear 
Facility/Activity, and remediation on those components continue. 
In accordance with INL safety analysis process requirements, an Evaluation of the Safety of the 
Situation (ESS) (Reference 4) resulted from the PISA and subsequent USQ.  The ESS will 
support a Justification for Continued Operations (JCO) to allow continued characterization 
activities for final hazard categorization of the VCO TRA-004 system. The ESS evaluates the 
potential hazards associated with the VCO TRA-004 system characterization activities of the 
VCO TRA-004 system inactive piping or components that have been initially categorized as 
HC 3 or greater, or cannot be categorized with existing sample data.
2. VCO SYSTEM ACTIVITY/DESCRIPTION 
2.1.1 VCO TRA-004 System 
VCO TRA-004 system piping and components are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. HC 3 or not 
categorized piping and components define the HC 3 or greater nuclear facility/activity boundary 
for the RTC VCO activities evaluated in the ESS. Piping and components shown in Figure 1 
and Figure 2 as less than HC 3 that are isolated are excluded from the RTC Inactive Piping 
Undergoing VCO Action Nuclear Facility/Activity. 
As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the VCO TRA-004 system includes a variety of lines that 
were used to transfer radioactive waste from RTC facilities to the TRA-613 pump vaults and 
subsequently, to either the TRA-713 hot waste storage tanks then to the tank truck loading dock 
(TRA-761) or discharged to TRA-712 retention basin as warm waste if it met the warm waste 
criteria. The VCO TRA-004 system includes the two TRA-613 pump vaults, the three TRA-713 
hot waste storage tanks, and associated piping and ancillary equipment. The following section 
summarizes the VCO TRA-004 system, isolation boundaries, system lines and components, and 
isolation valves.
3Figure 1. VCO TRA-004 Piping Diagram A. 
4Figure 2. VCO TRA-004 Piping Diagram B.
5The VCO TRA-004 project is currently characterizing TRA-004 components as part of RCRA 
closure plan preparation. Information gathered will aid in preparation of the RCRA closure plan, 
hazard categorization for closure activities, and for waste stream planning projections during 
RCRA closure. The portions of TRA-004 that are categorized as HC 3 or not categorized for lack 
of data do not have complete characterization. The data available is limited and not sufficient for 
making RCRA closure planning decisions or for waste stream disposition. Therefore, the VCO 
TRA-004 project needs to continue characterization activities on the inactive portions of the 
system under the ESS/JCO. 
As shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, various portions of the system are categorized as “Other,” 
HC 3, and not categorized due to lack of data. An “Other” facility is defined as any facility other 
than a HC 1, 2, or 3 facility or a radiological facility (Reference 5). Items categorized as “Other” 
have sufficient data for hazard categorization and, if isolated from the HC 3 and the not 
categorized piping and components, are excluded from the nuclear facility evaluation, with the 
exception of discussing their isolation. Items categorized as HC 3 or not categorized are the 
subject of the ESS and need additional activities performed to obtain complete characterization. 
The inactive VCO TRA-004 system components are either physically isolated (cut, capped, 
plugged, blind flanged, etc.) or isolated by closed and administratively locked valves. Active 
lines associated with VCO TRA-004 system, 3“ HDA-605/613 and 1-1/2“ HDA-670, are 
available to transfer waste from the ATR to TRA-605 and runs through the TRA-613B pump 
vault (neither line has been routinely used since the 1990s and would only be used under 
exceptional circumstances under the direct authorization of ATR management). These lines are 
isolated from other piping in the pump vaults by closed and locked Valves #25, 28, 29, 31, 47, 
49, 52, 64 and BL-CC-5-59. These active lines are not evaluated in the ESS but were discussed 
only to demonstrate that they have been isolated from the lines being evaluated. The 3” intravault 
piping is physically isolated by blind flange on the TRA-613A vault side of Valve #25. This 
physical isolation separates the line from the LTHC 3 piping in the TRA-613A vault. Therefore, 
Valve # 25 is not administratively controlled because the blind flange serves as an isolation 
boundary. A jumper cross-tie will be installed between 1 ½” HDA-670 and 3” HDA-613/605 
piping to the north of TRA-613. After the installation of this cross-tie, no operational piping will 
remain in the TRA-613 vaults. At that time valves (28, 29, 31, 47, 49, 52, 64, and BL-CC-5-59) 
will no longer be required as isolation boundaries. 
Refer to Table 1 below for a summary of VCO TRA-004 system components, isolation 
boundaries, isolation valve numbers, and hazard categorization results. 
6Table 1. TRA-613/TRA-713 Isolation Boundaries. 
Isolation Boundary Line/Component 
Isolation Valve Numbers or 
Physical Isolation Location 
Hazard Categorization 
Results
TRA-613A Influent/Effluent/Intravault Piping and TRA-613B Tank 
Inactive/Active  3“ HDA-630 Blind Flange on Valve 25 Other 
Inactive/Active 2“ WDA-613-A  Blind Flange on Valve 25 Other 
Inactive/Active 4“ HDA-642  Blind Flange on Valve 25 Other 
Inactive/Active 3“ HDA-613-A  Blind Flange on Valve 25 Other 
Inactive/Active 3“ HDA-644  Blind Flange on Valve 25 Other 
Inactive/Active Intravault piping for TRA-613A Blind Flange on Valve 25 Other 
Inactive/Inactive Other/ HC 3 TRA-713B hot waste storage tank 3” Influent line cut/plugged 
3” Effluent line cut/plugged 
HC 3 
Inactive – Isolated 4“ HDC-605  Isolated (plugged/capped) at both ends Not Categorized 
TRA-613B Influent/Effluent/Intra-Intervault Piping, TRA-713C and TRA-713D Tanks 
Inactive/Inactive 
Other/Not Categorized 
1-1/2” HDA-613 35, 36, 38 and 43 Other 
Inactive/Active and  
Inactive/Inactive Other/Not Categorized 
2” HDA-603-B  31 and 32 Other 
Inactive/Active and  
Inactive/Inactive HC 3 /Not Categorized 
2” HDA-661 29 and 30 HC 3 
Inactive/Active and Inactive/Inactive 
Other/Not Categorized and HC 3/Not 
Categorized 
Inter/intra vault piping for TRA-613B Blind Flange on Valve 25, 
Adminstratively locked and controlled 
closed Valves 28, 29, 31, 35, 38, 47, 49, 
52, 64 and BL-CC-5-59 
Not Categorized 
Inactive/Inactive 
Not Categorized/ HC 3 
TRA-713C hot waste storage tank 39 and 52 (inlet) 
33 (outlet) 
HC 3 
Inactive/Inactive 
Not Categorized/ HC 3 
TRA-713D hot waste storage tank 28, 30, 32, 40, 49, and 65 (inlet) 
34 (outlet) 
HC 3 
72.1.2 VCO TRA-004 System Characterization Activities 
VCO TRA-004 system characterization is being performed to support RCRA closure planning. 
Characterization may include collection of liquid, solid, and/or sludge samples, remote radiation 
readings, video, and Quality Assurance (QA) inspection and testing (e.g., ultrasonic thickness). 
Sample volume will vary depending on media collected and radiation levels. The amount of 
liquid removed during sampling ranges approximately from a few milliliters to several gallons 
and the amount of solids/sludge removed ranges approximately from a few milligrams to several 
kilograms depending on the radiation field. These amounts of sample material removed are a 
fraction of the total inventory in the lines and the disturbance of the radioactive or hazardous 
material in the lines is considered minimal. Liquid samples are typically collected using 
peristaltic pumps, syringes, or composite liquid waste sampler (COLIWASA) samplers. 
Solid/sludge samples are usually collected using spoons, scoops, scrapers, or similar methods to 
transfer the sample from the pipe/component to the sample container. 
Access to inactive piping and components will occur in order to collect samples. This may 
include hot tapping inactive piping, cutting inactive piping, disconnecting flanges, and similar 
methods of access. Upon completion of characterization activities, inactive piping will be left in 
a suitable condition, which may include blind flanges, mechanical pipe plugs, pipe caps, 
reconnecting the piping and maintaining the closed/locked valve, or other similar methods to 
maintain isolation. In general, it is desirable during characterization to provide physical isolation 
between sections of the system when inactive piping is accessed for sampling. 
3. VCO TRA-004 SYSTEM HAZARD ANALYSIS 
3.1.1 Methodology 
The hazard analysis methodology used in the ESS conforms to NS-18104 (Reference 6) for a HC 3 
activity and includes the following: 
1. Hazard Identification (Section 3.1.2) 
2. Hazard Categorization (Section 3.1.3) 
3. Hazard Evaluation (Section 3.1.4 
4. Hazard Evaluation Results (Section 3.1.5) 
5. Derived Hazard Controls (Section 3.1.6) 
83.1.2 Hazard Identification 
Hazard identification involved determining the following for the VCO TRA-004 system 
characterization:
1. The radioactive and hazardous material inventory (i.e., the type and amount of radioactive 
and hazardous material that is potentially releasable), form, and location.  
2. Potential energy sources and initiating events that could directly result in injury to workers 
or affect the inventory of radioactive and hazardous materials. 
3.1.2.1 VCO TRA-004 System Radioactive Material Inventory 
The wastes transferred through VCO TRA-004 system lines were contaminated liquids. 
Available sample results have identified radioactive material in the liquid and/or sludge 
remaining in the lines that exceed the HC-3 threshold quantities in DOE-STD-1027-92 
(Reference 6). 
3.1.2.2 Hazardous Materials 
The TRA-713 hot waste storage tanks (TRA-713B, TRA-713C, and TRA-713D and line 
2” HDA-661 contain hazardous materials. Hazardous materials may include cadmium, 
chromium, lead, mercury, and may include volatile organic compounds (VOCs), and 
semivolatile organic compounds (SVOCs). 
3.1.2.3 Energy Sources and Initiating Events 
Routine and non-routine hazards, energy sources, and initiating events that can result in an 
uncontrolled release of radioactive or hazardous material during VCO TRA-004 system 
characterization activities were identified. Routine hazards include standard industrial hazards 
(SIHs) or insignificant hazards. 
3.1.3 Hazard Categorization 
Hazard categorization per the guidance provided in DOE-STD-1027-92 was performed for VCO 
TRA-004 system piping and components. The hazard categorization results for VCO TRA-004 
system piping and components are summarized in Table 1. 
3.1.3.1 Technical Basis for VCO TRA-004 System Piping/Component Segmentation 
As stated in DOE-STD-1027-92, 
“…the standard permits the concept of facility segmentation provided the hazardous material in 
one segment could not interact with hazardous materials in other segments. For example, 
independence of HVAC and piping must exist in order to demonstrate independence for facility 
segmentation purposes. This independence must be demonstrated and places the “burden of 
proof” on the analyst.” 
9Table 2 Hazard Screening for VCO TRA-004 System Characterization Activities. 
Generic Hazard Type 
Present During 
Characterization 
Activities Explanation 
Standard Industrial Hazard Yes The characterization activities present no unique SIH hazards not found in similar characterization activities in 
other facilities/activities. A Job Safety Analysis is performed for the characterization work order. 
Radioactive material Yes Inventory of radioactive material for VCO TRA-004 systems as shown in Table 1 exceed the sum of ratios for HC 
3. Disturbing residue may result in spill or airborne release. 
Radiation Yes Radioactive material in inactive piping presents a radiation and contamination hazard to workers.  
Chemical material/energy Yes Chemical hazards in inactive piping have been identified. 
Fissile Material/Nuclear criticality  No Based on laboratory validation reports and other supporting documentation, the total amount of fissionable material 
is under 5 grams which is much less than the DOE-STD-1027-92 minimum criticality limits of 450 grams for Pu-
239, 500 grams for U-233, and 700 grams for U-235. 
Field and low-level fixed X-ray equipment No X-Ray equipment will not be used for characterization activities. 
Toxic materials Yes The quantities of all toxic substances used for characterization activities are considered SIHs covered by the 
Industrial Safety and Hygiene Program. 
Flammable/combustible material Yes The quantities of all flammable/combustible substances used for characterization activities are fire related hazards 
in the presence of an ignition source.  
Explosive materials No There will be no explosive materials used during characterization activities. 
Lasers No Lasers will not be used for characterization activities. 
Electrical No There are no high-energy electrical sources used for characterization activities. Electrical hazards from powered
tools are considered low-energy SIH. 
Kinetic energy Yes Powered vehicles or equipment (forklifts) may be used for characterization activities. Hot tapping piping, cutting 
piping, disconnecting flanges, and similar methods of access may require use of power tools.  
Pressure No No high-pressure systems will be used for characterization activities. 
High temperature/High Thermal Energy No No high-temperature systems will be used for characterization activities. 
Low Temperatures/Low Thermal Energy No Cryogenic materials will not be used for characterization activities 
Gravity-Mass/Potential Energy Yes Falling objects, falls from elevations greater than 6 ft (such as from scaffolding), and hoisting and rigging hazards 
may impact characterization activities. 
Biohazards No No evidence of biohazards other than those expected in high deserts, such as hantavirus and snake or insect bites.
Natural Phenomenon Yes Earthquakes, high winds, range fires, and cold temperatures/snow may result in sample or piping spills during 
characterization activities. 
10
The physical basis for segmentation with respect to the VCO TRA-004 system is the physical 
isolation of those pipes and components. Isolation features preclude transfer of hazardous 
material between inactive and active piping and components that are excluded from the scope of 
the ESS and the VCO TRA-004 system piping and components that are included in the scope 
during characterization activities, either during normal operations or during common severe 
phenomenon. Isolation features include: 
? Physical isolation between piping and components, including piping that has been cut and 
physically separated from other piping and components and plugged or capped at both ends 
? Isolation by administratively closed and locked valves that will be maintained when working 
at system boundaries. 
To protect the assumption that the closed and locked valves provide the required isolation, safety 
analysis commitments were identified and discussed further in Section 3.1.6. The safety analysis 
commitments ensure that VCO TRA-004 system piping and components that are excluded from 
the scope of the ESS are isolated from inactive piping and components that have been 
categorized as HC 3, or that have not been characterized, by at least one closed and 
administratively locked valve at each inactive system interface. Table 1 lists the VCO TRA-004 
system line and component segments, and specifically identifies the isolation boundary and 
isolation valve or component (i.e. capped/plugged line). 
3.1.4 Hazard Evaluation 
A qualitative hazard evaluation was performed for the hazards that can result in an uncontrolled 
release of radioactive or hazardous material and affect the off-site public, collocated workers, 
facility workers, or the environment. Table 3 provides summary information on the hazard, 
hazardous event, cause, likelihood, and consequence categories, risk bin, and preventative and 
mitigative features (i.e., design and administrative). Hazardous events listed in 3 are based on a 
What-if Analysis performed in support of the ESS.  
Standard industrial hazards are hazards that are routinely encountered in general industry and 
construction, and for which national consensus codes and/or standards exist, such as 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to guide safe design and operation. In 
accordance with the guidelines in DOE-STD-1027-92 (Reference 1) and DOE-STD-3009-94 
(Reference 7), no special analysis is required for these occupational hazards unless they are 
possible initiators or contributors for an accident involving an uncontrolled release of radioactive 
or hazardous material in which case they are included in the hazard analysis. A safety analysis 
commitment was made to implement an Industrial Safety Program for VCO TRA-004 system 
characterization activities.
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Table 3. Hazard Evaluation Summary for VCO TRA-004 System Characterization Activities.
Likelihood, Consequence, and Risk Without 
Controls Preventive and Mitigative Features 
Hazard Hazardous Event Cause 
Likelihood 
Categorya
Consequence 
Category 
Risk
Binb Design Administrative 
Release of radioactive 
material during 
characterization 
activities. 
Human error or 
equipment failure while 
performing 
characterization activities 
results in disturbing 
piping or component 
radioactive material. 
Anticipated 
(A) 
Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
7
7
11
None identified Radiation Protection Program 
Conduct of Operations 
Program 
Work Control Program 
Maintenance Program 
Direct radiation 
exposure in excess of 
planned exposures 
received during 
characterization 
activities. 
Human error or 
equipment failure while 
performing 
characterization activities 
results in disturbing 
piping or component 
radioactive material. 
Anticipated 
(A) 
Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
7
7
11
None identified Radiation Protection Program 
Conduct of Operations 
Program 
Work Control Program 
Maintenance Program 
1. Radioactive 
Material 
Release of radioactive 
material and/or Direct 
Radiation exposure 
received due to 
interaction of active 
process piping 
radioactive materials 
with inactive RTC 
piping during 
characterization 
activities.  
Human error or isolation 
valve failure results in 
radioactive material being 
released from active 
process piping lines into 
inactive piping lines 
while performing 
characterization activities. 
Anticipated 
(A) 
Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
7
7
11
RTC Piping 
Valve Isolation 
RTC Piping Isolation Valve 
Administrative Locks 
Radiation Protection Program 
Conduct of Operations 
Program 
Work Control Program 
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Table 3. Hazard Evaluation Summary for VCO TRA-004 System Characterization Activities.
Likelihood, Consequence, and Risk Without 
Controls Preventive and Mitigative Features 
Hazard Hazardous Event Cause 
Likelihood 
Categorya
Consequence 
Category 
Risk
Binb Design Administrative 
2. Hazardous 
Material 
Release of hazardous 
material during 
characterization 
activities. 
Human error or 
equipment failure while 
performing 
characterization activities 
results in disturbing 
piping or component 
hazardous material. 
Anticipated 
(A) 
Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
7
7
11
None Identified Industrial Safety and 
Industrial Hygiene Program 
Conduct of Operations 
Program 
Work Control Program 
Maintenance Program 
3. Flammable/ 
Combustibl
e Materials 
Fire in vicinity of 
characterization 
activities results in 
release of radioactive 
or hazardous material. 
Presence of ignition 
source and 
combustible/flammable 
materials during 
characterization activities 
results in fire and impact 
to piping or component 
radioactive or hazardous 
material.  
Anticipated 
(A) 
Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
7
7
11
None identified Fire Protection Program 
Conduct of Operations 
Program 
Work Control Program 
Radiation Protection Program 
Industrial Safety and 
Industrial Hygiene Program 
4. Gravity-
Mass
Radioactive or 
hazardous material 
release due to falling 
equipment or debris 
resulting in disturbance 
of radioactive or 
hazardous material. 
Human error or 
equipment failure results 
in falling equipment or 
debris and impact to 
piping or components 
disturbing radioactive or 
hazardous material. 
Anticipated 
(A) 
Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
7
7
11
None identified  Radiation Protection Program 
Conduct of Operations 
Program 
Work Control Program 
Maintenance Program 
Industrial Safety and 
Industrial Hygiene Program 
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Table 3. Hazard Evaluation Summary for VCO TRA-004 System Characterization Activities.
Likelihood, Consequence, and Risk Without 
Controls Preventive and Mitigative Features 
Hazard Hazardous Event Cause 
Likelihood 
Categorya
Consequence 
Category 
Risk
Binb Design Administrative 
5. Kinetic 
Energy
Release of piping or 
component radioactive 
or hazardous material 
during characterization 
activities. 
Human error or 
equipment failure results 
in impact to piping or 
component radioactive or 
hazardous material from 
energized equipment or 
moving vehicles. 
Anticipated 
(A) 
Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
7
7
11
None identified Radiation Protection Program 
Conduct of Operations 
Program 
Work Control Program 
Maintenance Program 
Industrial Safety and 
Industrial Hygiene Program 
6. Natural 
Phenomena 
Release of piping or 
component radioactive 
or hazardous material 
during characterization 
activities. 
Earthquake (seismic 
event), high winds, range 
fires, cold 
temperatures/snow results 
in release of piping or 
component radioactive or 
hazardous material. 
Unlikely (U) Off-Site Public: N 
Collocated Workers: N 
Facility Workers: L 
Environment: N 
4
4
8
None identified None required
a. The likelihood categories are listed and described in Table 3-3 of NS-18104 (Reference 6): A – Anticipated, U – Unlikely, EU – Extremely Unlikely, BEU – Beyond 
Extremely Unlikely. Consequence categories are listed and described in Table 3-4 of NS-18104 (Reference 6): N – negligible, L – low, M – moderate, and H – high. 
b. Risk bin numbers are described in Figures 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4 of NS-18104 (Reference 6). 
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3.1.5 Hazard Evaluation Results 
As shown in Table 3, the primary hazard event involves the release of radioactive or hazardous 
material and/or direct radiation exposure in excess of planned exposures or hazardous material 
exposure during characterization activities resulting from the disturbance of radioactive or 
hazardous material due to impacts from moving or falling equipment caused by equipment 
failure or human error. These events are conservatively estimated to be in the Anticipated 
frequency range. 
Due to the quantity and form of the radioactive and hazardous material in the piping and 
components, the likely result would be a localized radioactive or hazardous material release at 
the location of the characterization activity. 
Due to the quantity and form of the radioactive and hazardous material in the piping and 
components, and the limited amount of force/impact disturbing the radioactive/hazardous
material in the piping and components, the consequences to the public and collocated workers 
are quantitatively evaluated to be in the Negligible category. Therefore, as indicated in 
Figures 3-2 and 3-3 of NS-18104 for events with an Anticipated frequency category and a 
Negligible consequence category, no safety-class or safety-significant controls are required for 
protection of the public or collocated worker. 
The expected consequences due to a localized release of radioactive or hazardous material and/or 
direct radiation exposure in excess of planned exposures during characterization activities to the 
facility workers are qualitatively evaluated to be in the Low consequence category for both 
radioactive and hazardous material exposures. 
Based on the Risk Matrix in Figure 3-4 of NS-18104, the Risk Bin results for the facility worker 
shown in Table 3 indicate that no safety-significant controls are required for protection of the 
facility worker. Figure 3-4 of NS-18104 indicates that for events with an Anticipated frequency 
category and a Low consequence category, safety analysis commitments should be identified to 
manage facility worker risk. The results of the hazard summary from Table 3 indicate that the 
facility worker risk associated with VCO TRA-004 system activities can be managed through the 
identified safety analysis commitments. The safety analysis commitments shown in Table 3 are 
largely commitments to existing safety management programs. The safety analysis commitments 
are discussed in more detail below and the combined effect of these safety analysis commitments 
is to reduce the risk to the facility worker. 
15
3.1.6 Derived Hazard Controls 
3.1.6.1 Safety Analysis Commitments 
3.1.6.1.1 Design Commitments 
TRA-004 Piping Valve Isolation
The following design features were identified as important to worker safety in the Hazard 
Evaluation and shall be implemented: 
? VCO TRA-004 system inactive piping and components that are included in the scope of the 
ESS shall be isolated from the piping and components that are excluded from the scope of 
the ESS by at least one administratively closed and administratively locked valve at each 
system interface. 
3.1.6.1.2 Administrative Commitments 
RTC Piping Isolation Valve Administrative Locks
The following administrative features were identified as important to worker safety in the Hazard 
Evaluation and shall be implemented: 
? Lockout/Tagout procedures shall be used when working on inactive VCO TRA-004 system 
piping or components that interface with active piping or components that are excluded 
from the scope of the ESS. 
? Administrative locks shall be used when working on all other inactive VCO TRA-004 
system piping or components that interface with piping or components that are excluded 
from the scope of the ESS. 
Commitments were made to implement the following Safety Management Programs: 
? Radiation Protection Program 
? Industrial Safety and Industrial Hygiene Program 
? Maintenance/Work Control Program 
? Conduct of Operations Program 
? Fire Protection Program 
? Emergency Response Program 
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4. CONCLUSION
The piping and components shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 define the HC 3 or greater nuclear 
facility/activity boundary for the RTC VCO activities. Based on the hazard analysis performed 
for the characterization activities involving VCO TRA-004 system piping and components, 
characterization activities may safely continue with the implemented safety analysis 
commitments identified in the ESS. There are no restrictions on VCO activities for VCO 
TRA-004 system components that are categorized as less than HC 3. The primary hazard event 
associated with VCO action on inactive RTC piping and components involves the release of 
radioactive or hazardous material during characterization activities. This occurs by disturbing the 
radioactive or hazardous material as a result of impacts from moving or falling equipment caused 
by equipment failure or human error during characterization activities, or by fires or natural 
phenomenon events. 
Due to the quantity and form of the radioactive or hazardous material in the piping and 
components, there are negligible expected consequences to the public or collocated workers and 
low expected consequences to immediate workers. As a result, there are no safety-class or 
safety-significant controls required for protection of the public, collocated worker, or immediate 
worker.
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